Representation in Peer Selection: A Liquid Democracy Perspective

Prelegent(ci)

Georgios Papasotiropoulos

Afiliacja

University of Warsaw

Język referatu

angielski

Termin

12 lutego 2026 12:00

Pokój

p. 4060

Informacje na temat wydarzenia

seminar online

Seminarium

Seminarium „Ekonomia algorytmiczna”

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Suppose the members of MIMUW are electing a committee of size k from among themselves to represent the department at a university meeting. I only know a handful of people in the department, so figuring out my vote would have been tricky. Luckily, I trust Piotr---not only as a potential member of the committee, but also to decide on my behalf who should be selected. So, if Piotr approves Oskar, then Oskar joins my approval list too, together with Piotr and anyone else supported along this chain of trust.

This perspective naturally induces a class of approval-based preference profiles inspired by the defining feature of liquid democracy: the transitivity of trust. The peer selection problem can be viewed as a special case of multiwinner voting in which the sets of voters and candidates coincide. Bringing together ideas from liquid democracy and multiwinner voting ---two well-studied yet largely separate areas of computational social choice--- we examine how both new and established proportionality axioms behave in this novel restricted domain, and whether they are satisfied by several classical and newly proposed voting rules designed to provide representation guarantees.

This is a joint work with Davide Grossi and Grzegorz Lisowski (University of Groningen).

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