Coalitional Games in Participatory Budgeting

Prelegent(ci)

Grzegorz Pierczyński

Afiliacja

University of Warsaw

Język referatu

angielski

Termin

5 czerwca 2025 12:15

Pokój

p. 4050

Seminarium

Seminarium „Gry, mechanizmy i sieci społeczne”

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We study the setting of Participatory Budgeting elections, where individual projects may strategically form a coalition (merge into a single composite project) to improve their chances of being funded. We demonstrate that various well-established voting rules differ significantly in their susceptibility to such strategic behavior. In particular, we show that the GreedyAV rule tends to incentivize merging, unlike more cost-sensitive or proportional methods. Our theoretical analysis is supported by experiments that illustrate the impact of project merging on social welfare.

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