You are not logged in | Log in

Coalitional Games in Participatory Budgeting

Speaker(s)
Grzegorz Pierczyński
Affiliation
University of Warsaw
Language of the talk
English
Date
June 5, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Room
room 4050
Seminar
Seminar Games, Mechanisms, and Social Networks

We study the setting of Participatory Budgeting elections, where individual projects may strategically form a coalition (merge into a single composite project) to improve their chances of being funded. We demonstrate that various well-established voting rules differ significantly in their susceptibility to such strategic behavior. In particular, we show that the GreedyAV rule tends to incentivize merging, unlike more cost-sensitive or proportional methods. Our theoretical analysis is supported by experiments that illustrate the impact of project merging on social welfare.