Coalitional Games in Participatory Budgeting
- Speaker(s)
- Grzegorz Pierczyński
- Affiliation
- University of Warsaw
- Language of the talk
- English
- Date
- June 5, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
- Room
- room 4050
- Seminar
- Seminar Games, Mechanisms, and Social Networks
We study the setting of Participatory Budgeting elections, where individual projects may strategically form a coalition (merge into a single composite project) to improve their chances of being funded. We demonstrate that various well-established voting rules differ significantly in their susceptibility to such strategic behavior. In particular, we show that the GreedyAV rule tends to incentivize merging, unlike more cost-sensitive or proportional methods. Our theoretical analysis is supported by experiments that illustrate the impact of project merging on social welfare.