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Seminar Algorithmic Economics

The seminar deals with issues at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence and economics. We discuss results of our group members from game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice theory, mechanism design and social network analysis.

The seminar takes place roughly every 2 weeks. Once a month (usually on the first Thursday of the month), the seminar is held remotely and is connected with AGH.


Organizers

Information

Thursdays, 12:15 p.m. , room: 4060

Home page

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Research fields

List of talks

  • March 15, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
    Jadwiga Sosnowska (Instytut Informatyki UW)
    Path Evaluation and Centralities in Weighted Graphs – An Axiomatic Approach
    We study the problem of extending the classic centrality measures to weighted graphs. Unfortunately, in the existing extensions, paths in the graph are evaluated solely based on their weights, which is a restrictive and undesirable …

  • Jan. 25, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
    Rahul CS (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Group Activity Selection parameterized by the Number of Agent Types
    We study the parameterized complexity of GASP (Group Activity Selection Problem) and its variant gGASP w.r.t. the number of different agent types as a parameter. We show that GASP can be solved in polynomial time …

  • Jan. 11, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
    Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    A Pseudo-Polynomial Algorithm for Computing Power Indices in Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games
    Weighted voting games allow for studying the distribution of power between agents in situations of collective decision making. While the conventional version of these games assumes that any agent is always ready to cooperate with …

  • Dec. 21, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Marcin Waniek (Khalifa University of Science and Technology)
    Strategic Network Diffusion
    Spreading of ideas in a social network is usually modelled in the literature as a stochastic process. However, in many real-life applications the exact course of the diffusion can be guided by a certain individual …

  • Dec. 7, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Jan Woźnica (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Strategic Evasion of Centrality Measures
    Among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis are centrality measures, which are designed to rank nodes according to various criteria. Similarly to other tools, they were built around the assumption that individuals in …

  • Nov. 30, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Hide and seek game with heterogenous hiding places
    We study a conflict with multiple battlefields where two players, the hider and the seeker, choose their respective numbers of hiding places. The hiding places have different values and the score of the hider is …

  • Nov. 9, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, Uniwersytet Warszawski)
    An Axiomatization of the Eigenvector and Katz Centralities
    Feedback centralities are one of the key classes of centrality measures. They assess the importance of a vertex recursively, based on the importance of its neighbours. Feedback centralities includes the Eigenvector Centrality, as well as …

  • Oct. 26, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Krzysztof R. Apt (Instytut Informatyki, Uniwersytet Warszawski)
    Self-Stabilization Through the Lens of Game Theory
    In 1974 E.W. Dijkstra introduced the seminal concept of self-stabilization that turned out to be one of the main approaches to fault-tolerant computing. We show here how his three solutions can be formalized and reasoned …

  • Oct. 12, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Leonie Baumann (University of Cambridge)
    Identifying the best agent in a network
    This paper develops a mechanism for a principal to assign a prize to the most valuable agent from a set of heterogeneously valued agents in a network. The principal does not know the value of …

  • Oct. 5, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Tomasz Janus (Instytut Informatyki UW)
    On Strong Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in Network Creation Games
    We study strong equilibria in network creation games. These form a classical and well-studied class of games where a set of players form a network by buying edges to their neighbors at a cost of …

  • June 22, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Krzysztof Puchta (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    A cooperative solution for the three-nation problem of exploitation of the southern bluefin tuna
    W trakcie seminarium zaprezentowany zostanie artykuł "A Cooperative Solution for the Three-Nation Problem of Exploitation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna" autorstwa J. Krawczyka i B. Tolwinskiego W pracy: 1.) Rozwiązano problem gry kooperacyjnej. Do dalszych …

  • May 18, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Jadwiga Sosnowska (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Attachment Centrality for Weighted Graphs
    Measuring how central nodes are in terms of connecting a network has recently received increasing attention in the literature and a few dedicated centrality measures have been proposed. One of them is the Attachment Centrality …

  • May 11, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Axiomatic Characterization of Distance-based Centralities
    I will present our initial results concerning the characterization of the distance-based centralities. First, we characterize distance based centralities using Sabidussi's operations of adding and moving edges. Then, by adding one axiom we obtain a …

  • April 20, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Tomasz Michalak (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Strategic Social Network Analysis
    How can individuals and communities protect their privacy against graph-theoretic network analysis tools? How do criminals or terrorists organizations evade detection by such tools? Under which conditions can these tools be made strategy proof? These …

  • April 6, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
    Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    On the Construction of Covert Networks
    Centrality measures are widely used to identify leaders of covert networks. We study how a group of such leaders can avoid being detected. In more detail, we study the hardness of modifying the network in …