You are not logged in | Log in

The seminar deals with issues at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence and economics. We discuss results of our group members from game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice theory, mechanism design and social network analysis.

The seminar takes place roughly every 2 weeks. Once a month (usually on the first Thursday of the month), the seminar is held remotely and is connected with AGH.

Organizers

dr hab. Oskar Skibski, prof. ucz.
dr hab. Piotr Skowron, prof. ucz.

Information

Thursdays, 12:15 p.m. , room: 4060

Home page

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Research fields

List of talks

June 6, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
Kajetan Chmielewski (Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski)
Percepcja i rozumienie znaków przez przedstawicieli różnych kultur
Z powodu coraz częstszego wprowadzania pojazdów autonomicznych do ruchu w przestrzeni publicznej, których liczba ma do 2020 roku osiągnąć ponad 10 milionów 1, zauważyliśmy potrzebę stworzenia i wprowadzenia sytemu znaków informacyjnych biorących pod uwagę nowe …
May 30, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych, UW)
Applying non-Euclidean geometries to Social Network Analysis
Most data analysts take it for granted to use some subregions of a flat space as their data model, which means utilizing constructs that follow the principles of the Euclidean geometry. However, it is not …
April 25, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
Marcin Waniek (New York University Abu Dhabi)
Hiding in Multilayer Networks
Multilayer networks allow for modeling complex relationships, where individuals are embedded in multiple social networks at the same time. Given the ubiquity of such relationships, these networks are increasingly gaining attention in the literature. We …
April 11, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
Michał Jaworski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Multiwinner Elections - model with Issues
We study a model of Multiwinner Elections with Issues, in which we assume that an instance consists of a set of individuals (voters and candidates), desired committee size k and p Issues, which will be …
March 28, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
An Axiomatic Approach to the Manipulability of Centrality Measures
Centrality measures are among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis. Since network data is often incomplete, erroneous, or otherwise manipulated, increasing attention has recently been paid to studying the sensitivity of centrality measures …
March 7, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules
We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multiwinner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters---each voter approves a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size k; …
Jan. 24, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
Michał Godziszewski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Judgement Aggregation and Multiwinner Elections
In most general terms, the theory of judgement aggregation (JA) investigates rules for making consistent collective judgements on a set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgements on these propositions. A …
Dec. 6, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytu)
Approval-based elections and distortion of voting rules
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and each voter prefers candidates that are closer to him/her to those that are further away. Such a …
Nov. 22, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Attachment Centrality: Properties and Computation
Centrality indices aim to quantify the importance of nodes or edges in a network. Much interest has been recently raised by the body of work in which a node’s connectivity is understood less as its …
Nov. 8, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki UW)
Random Walk Decay Centrality
We propose a new centrality measure, called the Random Walk Decay centrality. While most centralities in the literature are based on the notion of shortest paths, this new centrality measure stems from the random walk …
Oct. 26, 2018, 12:15 p.m.
Dominik Peters (Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford)
Allocation of Indivisible Items with Connected Bundles
Suppose a collection of indivisible goods are arranged in a line, and we wish to allocate these items to agents so that each agent receives a connected bundle (an interval). This makes sense when the …
Oct. 18, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
How to hide in a network
We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We …
May 10, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Axiomatization of the PageRank centrality
We propose an axiomatization of PageRank. Specifically, we introduce five simple axioms – Foreseeability, Outgoing Homogeneity, Monotonicity, Merging, and Dummy Node – and show that PageRank is the only centrality measure that satisfies all of …
April 12, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki UW)
Approximating Optimal Social Choice under Metric Preferences
We consider voting under metric preferences: both voters and alternatives are associated with points in a metric space, and each voter prefers alternatives that are closer to her to ones that are further away. In …
March 29, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
Krzysztof Rządca (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Collective Schedules: Scheduling Meets Computational Social Choice
When scheduling public works or events in a shared facility one needs to accommodate preferences of a population. We formalize this problem by introducing the notion of a collective schedule. We show how to extend …