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The seminar deals with issues at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence and economics. We discuss results of our group members from game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice theory, mechanism design and social network analysis.
The seminar takes place roughly every 2 weeks. Once a month (usually on the first Thursday of the month), the seminar is held remotely and is connected with AGH.
Organizers
- dr hab. Oskar Skibski, prof. ucz.
- dr hab. Piotr Skowron, prof. ucz.
Information
Thursdays, 12:15 p.m. , room: 4060Home page
https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/Research fields
List of talks
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Dec. 4, 2025, noon
Kristýna Pekárková (University of Warsaw)
Identifying Imperfect Clones in Elections
In elections, perfect clones are groups of candidates that appear indistinguishable from the voters’ perspective – either they are ranked consecutively by every voter (in ordinal elections), or they are approved by exactly the same …
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Nov. 20, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Stach Kaźmierowski (University of Warsaw)
Possible President in Restricted Domains
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nominated candidates based on the voters' preferences. …
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Nov. 6, 2025, noon
Tomasz Wąs (University of Oxford)
Proportional Selection in Networks
We address the problem of selecting k representative nodes from a network, aiming to simultaneously achieve two objectives: identifying the most influential nodes and ensuring that the selection proportionally reflects the diversity within the network. …
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Oct. 16, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Piotr Kępczyński (University of Warsaw)
Union Shapley Value: Quantifying Group Impact via Collective Removal
We perform a comprehensive analysis of extensions of the Shapley value to groups. We propose a new, natural extension called the Union Shapley Value, which assesses a group's contribution by examining the impact of its …
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Oct. 9, 2025, noon
Piotr Faliszewski (AGH University of Science and Technology)
Diversity of Structured Domains
A domain of ordinal preferences is a set of rankings of candidates that rational agents may have. Structured domains include, e.g., the single-peaked one, where voters rank the candidates based on their proximity to the …
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June 26, 2025, noon
Krzysztof Sornat (AGH University of Science and Technology)
Robust Committee Voting, or The Other Side of Representation
We study approval-based committee voting from a novel perspective. While extant work largely centers around proportional representation of the voters, we shift our focus to the candidates while preserving proportionality. Intuitively, candidates supported by similar …
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June 5, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Grzegorz Pierczyński (University of Warsaw)
Coalitional Games in Participatory Budgeting
We study the setting of Participatory Budgeting elections, where individual projects may strategically form a coalition (merge into a single composite project) to improve their chances of being funded. We demonstrate that various well-established voting …
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May 29, 2025, noon
Stach Kaźmierowski (University of Warsaw)
Equilibria of the Colonel Blotto Games with Costs
We study a generalized variant of the Colonel Blotto game, referred to as the Colonel Blotto game with costs. Unlike the classic Colonel Blotto game, which imposes the use-it-or-lose-it budget assumption, the Colonel Blotto game …
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May 8, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Davide Grossi (University of Groningen)
Diversity in Approval-Based Committee Elections under Incomplete or Inaccurate Information (Diversity in Approval-Based Committee Elections under Incomplete or Inaccurate Information)
We study diversity in approval-based committee elections with incomplete and/or inaccurate information. As standard in the literature on approval-based multi-winner voting, we define diversity according to the maximum coverage problem, which is known to be …
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April 10, 2025, noon
Bartosz Kusek (AGH University of Science and Technology)
Bribery Can Get Harder in Structured Multiwinner Approval Election
We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping …
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April 3, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Nidhi Rathi (Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik)
New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items (New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items)
We study the fundamental problem of 'fairly' dividing a set of indivisible items among agents with varied valuations/preferences. But what does “fairly” mean? There is no single answer here and different ways of interpreting “fairly” …
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March 27, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Maciej Wojtala (University of Warsaw)
Attention-based communication for multi-agent reinforcement learning (Attention-based communication for multi-agent reinforcement learning)
In multi-agent reinforcement learning, problems that attract most research include action-value function decomposition and inter-agent communication. In most studies, these problems are addressed separately. In this paper, we introduce the aggregation of messages from all …
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March 20, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Mikołaj Czarnecki, Michał Korniak (University of Warsaw)
Indivisible Shapley Value
We consider the problem of payoff division in indivisible coalitional games, where the value of the grand coalition is a natural number. This number represents a certain quantity of indivisible objects, such as parliamentary seats, …
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March 13, 2025, noon
Tomasz Wąs (University of Oxford)
The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings
For the problem of aggregating several rankings into one ranking, Kemeny (1959) proposed two methods: the median rule which selects the ranking with the smallest total swap distance to the input rankings, and the mean …
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Jan. 23, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Grzegorz Lisowski (AGH University of Science and Technology)
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets
The Deferred Acceptance algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we …
