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The seminar deals with issues at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence and economics. We discuss results of our group members from game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice theory, mechanism design and social network analysis.

The seminar takes place roughly every 2 weeks. Once a month (usually on the first Thursday of the month), the seminar is held remotely and is connected with AGH.

Organizers

dr hab. Oskar Skibski, prof. ucz.
dr hab. Piotr Skowron, prof. ucz.

Information

Thursdays, 12:15 p.m. , room: 4060

Home page

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Research fields

List of talks

Jan. 5, 2023, noon
Piotr Faliszewski (AGH University in Kraków)
+ some more (Map of Elections: Diversity, Polarization, and Agreement In Elections)
In this talk I will present the idea of the map of (ordinal) elections and argue what it is good for. First, we will spend considerable amount of time on understanding diversity, polarization, and agreement …
Dec. 15, 2022, 12:15 p.m.
Stanisław Kaźmierowski (University of Warsaw)
Algorithm for solving the attack and interception game on networks
The paper "Attack and interception in networks" (F. Bloch, K. Chatterjee, B. Dutta, 2022), describes a game where a single attacker chooses a target and a path and each node chooses a level of protection. …
Dec. 8, 2022, noon
Piotr Skowron (Uniwersytet Warszawski)
Proportionality in General Social Choice Models
We consider a model where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that …
Nov. 17, 2022, 12:15 p.m.
Piotr Skowron (University of Warsaw)
Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities
We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to have arbitrary costs, and the voters to …
Nov. 3, 2022, noon
Łukasz Janeczko (AGH)
Ties in Multiwinner Approval Voting
We investigate ties in multiwinner approval voting both theoretically and experimentally. Specifically, we analyze the computational complexity of 1) determining if there is a tie in a given election for a given rule, and 2) …
Oct. 20, 2022, 12:15 p.m.
Jannik Peters (TU Berlin)
Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Approval-Based Satisfaction Functions
The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections. Two common -- but very different -- ways to measure the satisfaction …
Oct. 13, 2022, 12:15 p.m.
Michał Tomasz Godziszewski (University of Warsaw)
Election control for VCR Euclidean preferences
Election control problems model situations where some entity (traditionally called the election chair) wants to ensure some agent's victory (the so-called, Constructive Control) or loss (the so-called Destructive Control) by either adding or deleting candidates …
Oct. 6, 2022, noon
Marcin Dziubiński (University of Warsaw)
Selecting a Winner with Impartial Referees
We consider a problem of mechanism design without money, where a planner selects a winner among a set of agents with binary types and receives outside signals (like the report of impartial referees). We show …
July 6, 2022, 4 p.m.
Stanisław Szufa (AGH University in Kraków)
Numerical Experiments in Computational Social Choice
While many papers in computational social choice are theoretical, the number of experimental works is rapidly growing. During the tutorial, we will focus on experiments related to voting and participatory budgeting. We will discuss most …
June 8, 2022, 4 p.m.
Marcin Waniek (New York University Abu Dhabi)
Social diffusion sources can escape detection
Influencing (and being influenced by) others through social networks is fundamental to all human societies. Whether this happens through the diffusion of rumors, opinions, or viruses, identifying the diffusion source (i.e., the person that initiated …
May 26, 2022, 10:15 a.m.
Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Non-Euclidean Self-Organizing Maps
Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs, Kohonen networks) belong to neural network models of the unsupervised class. Most data analysts take it for granted to use some subregions of a flat space as their data model. However, assuming …
May 12, 2022, 10:15 a.m.
Michał Jaworski (Uniwersytet Warszawski)
Phragmen Rules for Degressive and Regressive Proportionality
We study two concepts of proportionality in the model of approval-based committee elections. In degressive proportionality small minorities of voters are favored in comparison with the standard linear proportionality. Regressive proportionality, on the other hand, …
April 28, 2022, 10:15 a.m.
Dominik Peters (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL)
Fast Preference Elicitation and Fairness in Voting
Talk 1: Many decision making systems require users to indicate their preferences via a ranking. It is common to elicit such rankings through pairwise comparison queries. By using sorting algorithms, this can be achieved by …
April 14, 2022, 10:15 a.m.
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Understanding Distance Measures Among Elections
Motivated by putting empirical work based on (synthetic) election data on a more solid mathematical basis, we analyze six distances among elections, including, e.g., the challenging-to-compute but very precise swap distance and the distance used …
March 31, 2022, 10:15 a.m.
Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Discrete Two Player All-Pay Auction with Complete Information
We study discrete two player all-pay auction with complete information. We provide full characterization of mixed strategy Nash equilibria and show that they constitute a subset of Nash equilibria of discrete General Lotto game. We …