

Hiding Stars with Fireworks: Location Privacy through Camouflage

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Outline

- Location based services
- Existing work and limitations
- CacheCloak
- System evaluation
- Results and analysis
- Distributed CacheCloak
- Conclusion



What is an LBS?

- A Location-Based Service (LBS)
 - an information or entertainment service
 - accessible with mobile devices through the mobile network
 - utilizing the ability to make use of the geographical position of the mobile device



Applications

- Requesting the nearest business or service, such as an ATM or restaurant
- Receiving alerts, such as warning of a traffic jam or receiving a discount coupon
- Geolife : provides a location-based to-do system



LBS

- LBS services rely on an accurate, continuous and real-time stream of location data
- Constant identification and tracking throughout the day
- Users may be hesitant to using LBSs



Privacy protection vs usefulness

- Degraded spatial accuracy
- Increased delay in reporting user's location
- Temporarily preventing the users from reporting locations at all

The user's location data may be less useful after privacy protections have been enabled



Trusted vs untrusted LBS

→ Trusted LBS

- Cannot be used anonymously, must know your identity

- A banking app might confirm that financial transactions are occurring in a user's hometown

→ Untrusted LBS

- Can reply meaningfully to anonymous or pseudonymous users

- “Where are the nearest ATMs?”

- CacheCloak can either act as a trusted intermediary for the user or a distributed and untrusted intermediary



K-Anonymity

- A user cannot be individually identified from a group of k users
- Send a sufficiently large “k-anonymous region” instead of a single GPS coordinate
- Decreases spatial accuracy
- May prevent meaningful use of various LBSs, especially in low density scenarios



CliqueCloak

- Wait until at least k different queries have been sent from a particular region

This allows the k -anonymous area to be smaller in space but expands its size in time

- *Real-time operation suffers*




Pseudonyms

- Each new location is sent to the LBS with a new pseudonym
- Frequent updating may expose a pattern of closely spaced queries
- Very effective when requests are infrequent



Pseudonyms with “Mix Zones”



- A mix zone exists whenever two users occupy the same place at the same time e.g. when two users approach an intersection
- The attacker cannot determine whether the users have turned or have continued to go straight



Pseudonyms with “Mix Zones”

- Rarity of space-time intersections, especially in sparse systems
- It is much more common that two users' paths intersect at different times



Path Confusion

- Extends the method of mix zones by resolving the same-place same-time problem
- Incorporate a delay in the anonymization
 - t_0 - the first user passes an intersection
 - t_1 - the second user passes an intersection
 - $t_0 < t_1 < t_0 + t_{delay}$



Path Confusion

- Path Confusion creates a similar problem as *CliqueCloak*
- *Real-time operation is compromised*
- *Path confusion will decide to do not release the users' locations at all if insufficient anonymity has been accumulated after $t_0 + t_{delay}$*



CacheCloak

- A trusted anonymizing server is needed
- On this server we have:
 - A prediction engine
 - Space for caching LBS data
 - Connections to users (wireless) and LBSs (a standard high-capacity wired link to a datacenter)




Predictive privacy

- It is a mobility prediction to do a prospective form of Path Confusion
- Predicted path intersections are indistinguishable to the LBS from a posteriori path intersections
- Keeps the accuracy benefits of Path Confusion but without incurring the delay of Path Confusion




Predictive privacy



Cache hit



Predictive privacy




Cache miss


CacheCloak



Predictive privacy



CacheCloak



Prediction engine


- The area is pixellated into a regular grid of squares 10m x 10m
- Each “pixel” is assigned an 8 x 8 historical counter matrix C
- c_{ij} - the number of times a user has entered from neighboring pixel i and exited toward neighboring pixel j
- This data has been previously accumulated from a historical database of vehicular traces from multiple users



Prediction engine



Pixellate




0	0	0	0	34	57	0	0
0	0	0	0	34	62	0	0
0	0	0	0	283	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	31	316	0	0	0	0	0
98	25	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Make Prediction



from Count Matrix



Iterated Markov model

- $P(i|j) = \frac{c_{ij}}{\sum_i c_{ij}}$ - probability that a user will exit side j given an entry from side i
- $P(j) = \frac{\sum_j c_{ij}}{\sum_i \sum_j c_{ij}}$ - probability that a user will exit side j without any knowledge of the entering side
- Select most likely pixel $\max (P(j|i))$ for $j = 1 \dots 8$
- Continue until the predicted path intersects with another previously predicted path
- Extrapolate backwards as well
- Send unordered sequence of predicted GPS coordinated to the LBS



CacheCloak

- Predictions are stored in the CacheCloak server
- Mispredicted segments of the user's path and stale data are not transmitted to the user
- Requests between the CacheCloak server and LBS are on a low-cost wired network
- Prevents absurd predictions such as passing through impassible structures or going the wrong way on one-way streets



Simulation

- Software coded in C on a Unix system
- A map of a 6km by 6km region of Durham County, NC (campus, residential areas, road networks)
- Virtual drivers obeyed traffic laws, accelerated according to physical laws and Census-defined speed limits
- The users' locations were written to the filesystem sequentially
- Trace files loaded into CacheCloak chronologically (simulation of a real-time stream of location updates from users)



Attacker model

- An “identifying location” is a place where revealing the user's current location identifies a user
- Prevent an attacker from following a user any significant distance away from “identifying locations”




Privacy metrics

- Location entropy – a quantitative measure of privacy based on the attacker's ability or inability to track the user over time
- It gives a precise quantitative measure of the attacker's uncertainty
- $$S = - \sum_i p_i(x, y) \log_2(p_i(x, y))$$
- S – number of bits (location entropy)
- 2^S equally likely locations will result in S bits of entropy; the inverse does not strictly hold




Results and analysis




6: Distribution of users Vs. distance traversed in 20 minutes. Most users traversed around 1 to 2 miles.



Results and analysis




7: Mean entropy over time for different user densities. Even with 10 to 50 users, the achieved entropy is around 5 bits in 10 minutes (600s). In reality, the number of users are likely to be far greater, resulting in greater entropy.




8: Worst-case entropy over time for different user densities. Around 2.7 bits of entropy achieved even with 10 users.



Results and analysis




9: Best-case entropy over time for different user densities.



10: Entropy after 10 minutes of attempted tracking for different user densities.




Results and analysis



11: One arbitrary user's entropy over time in different density conditions




Results and analysis



12: Three arbitrary users' entropies over time ($n = 50$)




Results and analysis



13: The time evolution of a random user's entropy over 30 minutes.




Results and analysis



15: Average number of locations a user might be according to a 0.1 threshold.




Results and analysis



16: Average number of locations a user might be according to a 0.2 threshold.



Results and analysis



17: Variation of number of peaks left after 10 minutes at different densities and thresholds. The number of peaks for a given threshold decreases with increasing users, showing that more users offer greater opportunity to hide.




Distributed CacheCloak


- CacheCloak requires the users to trust the server
- What if the users do not wish to trust CacheCloak?
- The need to rearrange the structure of the previous system



Centralised CacheCloak (reminder)



Distributed CacheCloak



Distributed CacheCloak

- The CacheCloak server is only necessary to maintain the global bit-mask from all users in the system
- The user never reveals to CacheCloak nor the LBS its actual location



Distributed CacheCloak drawbacks

- The historical prediction matrix needs to be obtained from the server which creates bandwidth overhead
- But we can compress this data
- Users receive the same quality of service in the distributed form but their mobile devices must perform more computation



Pedestrian users

- So far only vehicular movements were taken
 - Realistic vehicular movements can be simulated easily in very large numbers
- Pedestrians follow paths just between a source and a destination just as vehicles do
- More difficult to get enough historical mobility data to bootstrap the prediction system
 - Obtain walking directions from realistic source-destination pairs on Google Maps



Bootstrapping CacheCloak

- A new LBS starts with zero users
- If privacy cannot be provided to the first new users, it may be difficult to gain a critical mass of users for the system
- CacheCloak works well with very sparse populations
- CacheCloak can be used initially with simulation-based historical data



Conclusion

- Existing location privacy methods require a compromise between accuracy real-time operation and continuous operation
- CacheCloak eliminates the need for these compromises
- Mobility predictions are made for each mobile user
- Camouflaging users in a “crowd”
- Centralized and distributed forms of CacheCloak
- Tracebased simulation of CacheCloak with GIS data of a real city with realistic mobility modeling



Conclusion

- An attacker cannot track a user over a significant amount of time
- Can work in in extremely sparse systems where other techniques fail
- The cost of the privacy preservation is purely computational
- No new limitations on the quality of user location data
- This is a new location privacy method that can meet the demands of emerging LBSs



Questions

