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Wydział Matematyki, Informatyki i Mechaniki Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego

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Seminarium „Gry, mechanizmy i sieci społeczne”

Cotygodniowe seminarium badawcze (brak strony WWW)


Lista referatów

  • 2019-04-11, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Michał Jaworski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Multiwinner Elections - model with Issues

    We study a model of Multiwinner Elections with Issues, in which we assume that an instance consists of a set of individuals (voters and candidates), desired committee size k and p Issues, which will be voted on by the winning committee. The goal is to select a winning committee such that decision ma...

  • 2019-03-28, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    An Axiomatic Approach to the Manipulability of Centrality Measures

    Centrality measures are among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis. Since network data is often incomplete, erroneous, or otherwise manipulated, increasing attention has recently been paid to studying the sensitivity of centrality measures to such distortions. However, thus far no ...

  • 2019-03-07, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules

    We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multiwinner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters---each voter approves a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size k; the goal is to select a committee (a subset) of k alternat...

  • 2019-01-24, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Michał Godziszewski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Judgement Aggregation and Multiwinner Elections

    In most general terms, the theory of judgement aggregation (JA) investigates rules for making consistent collective judgements on a set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgements on these propositions. A multiwinner election rule is a formal process for selecting a sub...

  • 2018-12-06, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytu)

    Approval-based elections and distortion of voting rules

    We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and each voter prefers candidates that are closer to him/her to those that are further away. Such a metric space can be e.g. an issue space of their political views. We will measure the quality...

  • 2018-11-22, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Attachment Centrality: Properties and Computation

    Centrality indices aim to quantify the importance of nodes or edges in a network. Much interest has been recently raised by the body of work in which a node’s connectivity is understood less as its contribution to the quality or speed of communication in the network and more as its role in ena...

  • 2018-11-08, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki UW)

    Random Walk Decay Centrality

    We propose a new centrality measure, called the Random Walk Decay centrality. While most centralities in the literature are based on the notion of shortest paths, this new centrality measure stems from the random walk on the network. We provide an axiomatic characterization and show that the new cen...

  • 2018-10-26, godz. 12:15, 4050

    Dominik Peters (Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford)

    Allocation of Indivisible Items with Connected Bundles

    Suppose a collection of indivisible goods are arranged in a line, and we wish to allocate these items to agents so that each agent receives a connected bundle (an interval). This makes sense when the items have a spatial or temporal structure, for example when allocating time slots, and agents are i...

  • 2018-10-18, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    How to hide in a network

    We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on...

  • 2018-05-10, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Axiomatization of the PageRank centrality

    We propose an axiomatization of PageRank. Specifically, we introduce five simple axioms – Foreseeability, Outgoing Homogeneity, Monotonicity, Merging, and Dummy Node – and show that PageRank is the only centrality measure that satisfies all of them. Our axioms give new conceptual and ...

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