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Cotygodniowe seminarium badawcze (brak strony WWW)
2021-10-07, godz. 10:15, 4050
Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Core-Stable Committees under Restricted Domains
We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections, participatory budgeting, and facility-location. We focus on the c...
Krzysztof Apt (Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica i Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Well-founded extensive games with perfect information
We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations for two classes of these games in which subgame perfect equil...
2021-04-29, godz. 10:15, on-line
Marcin Waniek (New York University Abu Dhabi)
Disinformation attacks on cities
Disinformation continues to raise concerns due to its increasing threat to society. Nevertheless, a disinformation-based attack on critical infrastructure has never been studied to date. In this line of work we consider two possible attack scenarios. In the first scenario, we consider urban traffic ...
2021-04-15, godz. 10:15, on-line
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
An Axiom System for Feedback Centralities
In recent years, the axiomatic approach to centrality measures has attracted attention in the literature. However, most papers propose a collection of axioms dedicated to one or two considered centrality measures. In result, it is hard to capture the differences and similarities between various meas...
2021-03-18, godz. 10:15, on-line
Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Market-Based Explanations of Collective Decisions
We consider approval-based committee elections, in which a size-k subset of available candidates must be selected given approval sets for each voter, indicating the candidates approved by the voter. A number of axioms capturing ideas of fairness and proportionality have been proposed for this framew...
2021-03-04, godz. 10:15, on-line
Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Discrete Hyperbolic Random Graph Model
The hyperbolic random graph model (HRG) has proven useful in the analysis of scale-free networks, which are ubiquitous in many fields, from social network analysis to biology. However, working with this model is algorithmically and conceptually challenging because of the nature of the distances in t...
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Signed Graph Games: Coalitional Games with Friends, Enemies and Allies
We extend the well-known model of graph-restricted games due to Myerson to signed graphs, where the link between any two players may be either positive or negative. Hence, in our model, it is possible to explicitly define not only that some players are friends (as in Myerson’s model) but also that...
Michał Godziszewski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
An Analysis of Approval-Based Committee Rules for 2D-Euclidean Elections
We study approval-based committee elections for the case where the voters' preferences come from a 2D-Euclidean model. We consider two main issues: First, we ask for the complexity of computing election results. Second, we evaluate election outcomes experimentally, following the visualization te...
Michał Lewandowski i Paweł Kalczyński (Zakład Analizy i Wspomagania Decyzji, SGH, College of Business and Economics, California State University – Fullerton)
We define a new carpooling game (or more generally a task completion game) as an extension of the cost-sharing game and propose optimization algorithms to find stable allocations, i.e. match players to carpools and determine the distance they traveled. The game key features include: coalition size i...
Michał Jaworski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Phragmén Rules for Degressive and Regressive Proportionality
We study two concepts of proportionality in the model of approval-based committee elections. In degressive proportionality small minorities of voters are favored in comparison with the standard linear proportionality. Regressive proportionality, on the other hand, requires that larger subdivisions o...
