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Wydział Matematyki, Informatyki i Mechaniki Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego

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Seminarium „Gry, mechanizmy i sieci społeczne”

Cotygodniowe seminarium badawcze (brak strony WWW)

Lista referatów

  • 2023-11-30, godz. 12:15, 4050

    Marcin Dziubiński (University of Warsaw)

    Interconnected Battles

    We study a model of multibattle contest with two players and spillovers of efforts between battles. The players distribute their costly efforts across the battles. Each battle receives effort assigned to it directly (real efforts) as well as spillovers of efforts assigned to the other...

  • 2023-11-23, godz. 12:15, 4050

    Marcin Waniek (University of Warsaw)

    Modelling global market access using networks

    In this (very much in progress) work we use network science techniques to model access of different locations around the world to the global market. It was shown in the literature that it is possible to surprisingly accurately predict the economic activity in a specific place (measured via the inten...

  • 2023-11-09, godz. 12:00, online seminar

    Grzegorz Lisowski (AGH University of Science and Technology)

    Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting

    We study strategic behaviour of project proposers in the  context of approval-based participatory budgeting, assuming that the votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices as possible, provided that their projects get selected and the prices are ...

  • 2023-10-19, godz. 12:15, 4050

    Georgios Papasotiropoulos (Athens University of Economics and Business)

    Conditional Approval Voting: Winner Determination, Strategic Control and Proportionality Considerations

    Picture a group of friends in Warsaw deciding on a shared meal: a starter and a main course. One among them loves pierogi and would like to go for bigos afterwards--easy to vote for in the classical approval voting setting. Meanwhile, another in the group, while also ap...

  • 2023-10-09, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Makoto Yokoo (Kyushu University)

    Matching Market Design with Constraints

    Two-sided matching deals with finding a desirable combination of two parties, e.g., students and colleges, workers and companies, and medical residents to hospitals. Beautiful theoretical results on two-sided matching have been obtained, i.e., the celebrated Deferred Acceptance m...

  • 2023-10-05, godz. 12:00, online

    Oskar Skibski (University of Warsaw)

    Vitality Indices and Game-Theoretic Centralities

    Vitality indices form a natural class of centrality measures that assess the importance of a node based on the impact its removal has on the network. In this talk, we will discuss the connection between vitality indices and game-theoretic centrality measures, which are centrality measures defined ba...

  • 2023-06-22, godz. 12:00, s. zdalne

    Jarosław Flis (Uniwersytet Jagielloński)

    Ordynacja Proporcjonalno-Lokalna - ordynacja dla Polski?

    Opracowanie to przedstawia oryginalny projekt ordynacji proporcjonalno-lokalnej (dalej „ordynacji PL”), będący odpowiedzią na postulat wprowadzenia w Polsce ordynacji mieszanej. Proponowany system jest możliwie zbliżony do obecnego, choć jednocześnie wprowadza starannie przemyśla...

  • 2023-05-18, godz. 12:15, 4050

    Natalia Kucharczuk (University of Warsaw)

    Group Vitality Indices and the Shapley Value

    We will start the presentation by showing a link between Vitality Indices and Shapley Value-based induced game-theoretic centralities. It is a foundation of our current research regarding extending vitality indices into groups. We propose novel definitions of Group Vitality Indices and Group Shapley...

  • 2023-05-04, godz. 12:00, online

    Grzegorz Pierczyński (University of Warsaw)

    Market-Based Explanations of Collective Decisions

    We consider approval-based committee elections, in which a size-k subset of available candidates must be selected given approval sets for each voter, indicating the candidates approved by the voter. A number of axioms capturing ideas of fairness and proportionality have been proposed for this framew...

  • 2023-03-23, godz. 12:15, 4050

    Jorge Salas (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile & University of Edinburgh)

    How Do Centrality Measures Choose the Root of Trees?

    Centrality measures are widely used to assign importance to graph-structured data. Recently, understanding the principles of such measures has attracted a lot of attention. Given that measures are diverse, this research has usually focused on classes of centrality measures. In this work, we provide ...