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Weekly research seminar
2017-03-09, 10:15, 1780
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Axiomatic Characterization of Game-Theoretic Network Centralities
In this work, we focus on the game-theoretic approach to centrality analysis. While various centrality indices have been proposed based on this approach, it is still unknown what distinguishes this family of indices from the more classical ones. In this paper, we answer this question by providing th...
2017-01-12, 10:15, 1780
Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Players are endowed with resources. A player can engage in conflict with others to enlarge his resources. The set of potential conflicts is defined by a contiguity network. Players are farsighted and aim to maximize their resources. They decide on whether to wage war or remain peaceful. The winner o...
2016-12-15, 10:15, 1780
Piotr Dworczak (Stanford University)
Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets
I study a model of mechanism design in which the mechanism is followed by an aftermarket, that is, a post-mechanism game played between the agent and other market participants. The designer has preferences that depend on the final outcome but she cannot directly redesign the aftermarket. However, sh...
2016-12-01, 10:15, 1780
Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)
Multiwinner Election Rules: Axioms and Applications
We consider multiwinner election rules and discuss some of their properties. In particular we discuss the concept of proportional representation of multiwinner election rules. Informally, proportional representation requires that the extent to which a particular preference or opinion is represen...
2016-10-27, 10:15, 1780
Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki UW)
On Hiding Communities and Evading Link Prediction in Social Networks
Community detection and link prediction are two of the main research problems in social network analysis. While various private and public institutions are interested in identifying communities, it raises serious privacy issues as well as security-related concerns. We introduce the problem of hid...
2016-10-13, 10:15, 1780
Takamasa Suzuki (Kyushu University)
Efficient assignment mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints
We consider an assignment problem of multiple types goods to agents, where each type of a good has multiple copies (e.g., multiple seats of a school). Each agent is endowed with a good. Some distributional constraints are imposed on the allocation (e.g., minimum/maximum quotas, the balance of r...
2016-05-19, 12:15, 1770
Oskar Skibski (Wydział MIM UW)
k-Coalitional Cooperative Games
In most previous models of coalition structure generation, it is assumed that agents may partition themselves into any coalition structure. In practice, however, there may be physical and organizational constraints that limit the number of co-existing coalitions. In this paper, we introduce k-coalit...
2016-05-05, 12:15, 1770
Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)
Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules
We provide an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules, analogues of the scoring rules for the multiwinner elections. We show that committee scoring rules are characterized by the set of four standard axioms, anonymity, neutrality, consistency and continuity, and by two axioms specific ...
2016-04-14, 12:15, 1770
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)
Attachment Centrality: An Axiomatic Approach to Connectivity in Networks
In many social networks, certain nodes play more important roles than others. Consequently, the concept of centrality index has been extensively studied in the literature. More recently, a number of new centrality indices have been proposed in an attempt to reflect the following fundamental property...
2016-03-31, 12:15, 1770
Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)
The Dollar Auction with Spiteful Bidders
Shubik's (all-pay) dollar auction is a simple yet powerful auction model that aims to shed light on the motives and dynamics of conflict escalation. Common intuition suggests that the dollar auction is a trap, inducing conflict by its very design. However, O'Neill proved that, contrary to the experi...
