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Wydział Matematyki, Informatyki i Mechaniki Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego

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Seminar Games, Mechanisms, and Social Networks

Weekly research seminar


List of talks

  • 2016-05-19, 12:15, 1770

    Oskar Skibski (Wydział MIM UW)

    k-Coalitional Cooperative Games

    In most previous models of coalition structure generation, it is assumed that agents may partition themselves into any coalition structure. In practice, however, there may be physical and organizational constraints that limit the number of co-existing coalitions. In this paper, we introduce k-coalit...

  • 2016-05-05, 12:15, 1770

    Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)

    Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules

    We provide an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules, analogues of the scoring rules for the multiwinner elections. We show that committee scoring rules are characterized by the set of four standard axioms, anonymity, neutrality, consistency and continuity, and by two axioms specific ...

  • 2016-04-14, 12:15, 1770

    Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)

    Attachment Centrality: An Axiomatic Approach to Connectivity in Networks

    In many social networks, certain nodes play more important roles than others. Consequently, the concept of centrality index has been extensively studied in the literature. More recently, a number of new centrality indices have been proposed in an attempt to reflect the following fundamental property...

  • 2016-03-31, 12:15, 1770

    Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)

    The Dollar Auction with Spiteful Bidders

    Shubik's (all-pay) dollar auction is a simple yet powerful auction model that aims to shed light on the motives and dynamics of conflict escalation. Common intuition suggests that the dollar auction is a trap, inducing conflict by its very design. However, O'Neill proved that, contrary to the experi...

  • 2016-03-17, 12:15, 1770

    Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)

    Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Classification and Hierarchy

    We present and advertise the class of committee scoring rules, recently introduced as multiwinner analogues of single-winner scoring rules. We present a hierarchy of committee scoring rules (while includes all previously studied subclasses of committee scoring rules, as well as two new subclasses), ...

  • 2016-03-03, 12:15, 3320

    Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)

    Network elicitation in adversarial environment

    We consider a problem of a defender who wants to protect a network against a contagious attack. The defender could only protect a fixed number of nodes and does not know the network. Each of the nodes in the network does not know the network either, but knows his/her neighbours only. We propose an i...

  • 2016-01-07, 12:15, 3320

    Jaideep Roy (Deakin University)

    Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion

    We analyse the `optimal' size of non-deliberating majoritarian committees with no conflict of interest among its members when committees can be persuaded by a biased and informed expert. We find that when this bias is small, the optimal size is one; when it is intermediate, the optimal size increase...

  • 2015-12-17, 12:15, 3320

    Piotr Skowron (Google)

    Multi-Winner Elections: What do we Elect Committees for?

    We present a brief overview of several interesting multi-winner election rules and we identify a broad natural class of multi-winner score-based rules (called committee-scoring rules), and we show that several existing interesting rules can be captured by this class. Within this class we identify th...

  • 2015-11-19, 12:15, 3320

    Qiang Zhang (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)

    Truthful Cake Cutting Mechanisms with Externalities

    Cake cutting is a fundamental problem that studies fair resource division among agents. In this talk, I will review some classical cake cutting algorithms and discuss research directions in cake cutting problems. In particular, we will see truthful cake cutting mechanisms when agents not only value ...

  • 2015-11-05, 12:15, 3320

    Tomasz Michalak (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)

    Game-Theoretic Centrality Measures

    In this talk, we discuss the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each coalition of nodes is determined by certain graph properties. Next,...

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