

Descriptive complexity vs. decidability for MSO

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Journées d'Informatique Fondamentale de Paris Diderot
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Regular expressions


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Finite automata




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Monadic Second-Order logic


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
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


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
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
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
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
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Language defined by ψ

$$L(\psi) = \{w \in A^* : w \text{ satisfies } \psi\}$$

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
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Satisfiability problem

Given an MSO formula ψ decide whether $L(\psi) \neq \emptyset$?

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
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Formula is a **declarative** definition of the language.
Automata are more **operational**.

$$L = (a \mid b \mid c)^* abc (a \mid b \mid c)^*$$


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Deterministic automaton — only one transition to use




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Non-deterministic automaton — many possible transitions



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


Run of an automaton

$$\begin{aligned} w &= a \quad b \quad b \quad a \quad b \quad c \quad c \\ \rho &= q_I \rightarrow q_I \rightarrow q_I \rightarrow q_I \rightarrow q_a \rightarrow q_b \rightarrow q_c \rightarrow q_c \end{aligned}$$

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
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A run ρ is **accepting** if it ends in a final state.

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
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deterministic : $\{w \in A^* : \text{the run of } \mathcal{A} \text{ on } w \text{ is accepting}\}$

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non-det. : $\{w \in A^* : \text{exists an accepting run of } \mathcal{A} \text{ on } w\}$

Theorem (Büchi [1960], Elgot [1961], Trakhtenbrot [1962])

For $L \subseteq A^$ the following conditions are (effectively) equivalent:*

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Given a **non-deterministic** automaton compute an equivalent **deterministic** one (via powerset construction).

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Deciding satisfiability

Take ψ , compute an equivalent automaton \mathcal{A} , check if \mathcal{A} accepts some word.

Simplifying the formulæ

ψ — MSO formula (many quantifiers inside)

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\mathcal{A} — deterministic automaton

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ψ' — **simplified** formula

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$\psi' = \exists_{\rho} (\rho \text{ is a run of } \mathcal{A}) \wedge (\rho \text{ is accepting})$

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$\exists_{\vec{X}} (\dots)$ — **existential** formula

Simplifying the formulæ

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ψ' = $\underbrace{\exists_{\rho} (\rho \text{ is a run of } \mathcal{A}) \wedge (\rho \text{ is accepting})}_{\exists_{\vec{X}} (\dots) \text{ — existential formula}}$

ψ'' = $\underbrace{\forall_{\rho} (\rho \text{ is a run of } \mathcal{A}) \Rightarrow (\rho \text{ is accepting})}_{\forall_{\vec{X}} (\dots) \text{ — universal formula}}$

Infinite words

$$w = \textcircled{a} - \textcircled{a} - \textcircled{a} - \textcircled{a} - \textcircled{b} - \textcircled{c} - \textcircled{c} - \textcircled{b} - \dots \in A^\omega$$

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What about automata?

When an infinite run ρ is **accepting**?

There is no *last* state!

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Büchi automata

A run of a Büchi automaton is accepting if it visits a final state **infinitely many times**.

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Parity automata

Each state q has **priority** $\Omega(q) \in \mathbb{N}$.

A run ρ of a parity automaton is accepting if:

the highest priority visited infinitely often is **even**.

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Original proof (Büchi)

Only Büchi automata, no determinization, direct complementation:

given \mathcal{A} compute \mathcal{B} such that $L(\mathcal{B}) = A^\omega \setminus L(\mathcal{A})$.

Equivalence

Theorem (Büchi [1962], McNaughton [1966], ...)

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Problems

Powerset construction is not enough to determinize!

Deterministic Büchi automata are too weak.

Determinization procedure is complicated.

Using non-deterministic Büchi automata and complementation

Decidability of $L(\psi) \neq \emptyset$.

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Verification of interactive systems

- model a system as a finite automaton,
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- construct an automaton \mathcal{B} recognising bad behaviours
- check for emptiness of \mathcal{B} .

Equivalence continued

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
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Using deterministic parity automata

Even more: memoryless winning strategies, Wagner hierarchy, ...

Infinite trees — labellings of the full binary tree




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Trees are expressive

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


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


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


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
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What about decidability?

Given ψ check if there is a tree satisfying ψ ?

Theorem (Rabin [1969])

The satisfiability problem is decidable for MSO formulæ over infinite trees.

Mother of all decidability results

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ρ is **accepting** if it satisfies the acceptance condition on **all infinite branches** of the tree.

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$$L(\mathcal{A}) = \left\{ t : \exists_{\text{run } \rho} \forall_{\text{branch } \pi} \rho \text{ is accepting on } \pi \right\}$$

No simple automata for infinite trees

Theorem (Rabin [1969], Emerson&Jutla [1991], Mostowski [1991])

The following conditions are (effectively) equivalent for a language of trees L :

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1) **Deterministic** top-down automata are strictly weaker.

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- 2) Non-deterministic **Büchi** tree automata do not recognise all regular tree languages.

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Proof of **2)**

Pumping argument **OR** *descriptive complexity* argument. . .

Idea

How many set quantifiers **need** to appear in a definition of $L \subseteq X$:

$$L = \{x : \varphi\}?$$

(We don't restrict φ to MSO, it can be any formula of **arithmetic**.)

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How to **compare** descriptive complexity of languages?

As for **NP**: known **complete sets** and appropriate **reductions**.

Descriptive complexity

Idea

How many set quantifiers **need** to appear in a definition of $L \subseteq X$:

$$L = \{x : \varphi\}?$$

(We don't restrict φ to MSO, it can be any formula of **arithmetic**.)

How to **compare** descriptive complexity of languages?

As for **NP**: known **complete sets** and appropriate **reductions**.

Better than **NP**

The hierarchy is **strict**: for every n there is a set L that **requires** n

set quantifiers: $\underbrace{\forall \exists \dots \forall \exists}_n$.

Intuition

Any **machine** recognising L gives an **upper bound** on the descriptive complexity of L .

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If \mathcal{M} is a non-deterministic ω -word machine with a **Borel** acceptance condition then

$$L(\mathcal{M}) = \{w : \exists \rho (\rho \text{ is a run}) \wedge (\rho \text{ is accepting})\}$$

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Note

All additional **features** allowed in \mathcal{M} : counters, stacks, tapes, ...

The other way round

Research plan

Look for examples of languages **requiring** many set quantifiers.
Derive some **undefinability** / **undecidability** results.

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Theorem (Gurevich, Shelah [1982])

*The MSO theory of $(\mathbb{R}, <)$ is **undecidable**.*

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Behind the scenes

Theorem (Gurevich, Shelah [1982])

*The MSO theory of $(\mathbb{R}, <)$ is **undecidable**.*

Conjecture (Shelah [1975])

*The MSO theory of $(\mathbb{R}, <, \mathbf{Borel})$ where set quantifiers range over **Borel** subsets of \mathbb{R} is **decidable**.*

The other way round — a classical example

Theorem (Rabin)

*There is a regular tree language that is not recognised by any **non-deterministic Büchi** tree automaton.*

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A pumping argument.

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Show that if \mathcal{B} is a **non-deterministic Büchi** tree automaton then there is an **existential** formula of arithmetic φ such that

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For example:

$$\left\{ t : \bigvee_{\text{branch } \pi} \text{almost all letters on } \pi \text{ are } a \right\}$$

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Extend MSO with an additional quantifier U such that

$U_X \psi(X) \iff \psi(X)$ holds for **arbitrarily big** finite sets X .

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Theorem (Bojańczyk, Toruńczyk [2012])

*Satisfiability problem of **weak** $MSO+U$ is decidable over infinite trees.*

Round 1 (joint with Hummel)

Theorem (Hummel, S. [2010])

*There is an ω -word language definable in $MSO+U$ that requires at least one *universal* set quantifier.*

*This language is not recognised by *any* non-deterministic machine with a *Borel* acceptance condition.*

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Corollary

*There is **no model** of alternating machines on ω -words with a **fixed projective** acceptance condition capturing $MSO+U$.*

Theorem (B., G., M., S. [2013] (unpublished))

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Corollary

If there exists a proof that $MSO+U$ is decidable over infinite trees

then

*Set Theory is *inconsistent*.*

Intermediate statement

If Λ is **any extension of MSO** that defines **some** ω -word language requiring **6** alternations of set quantifiers

then (assuming $V=L$)

the Λ -theory of the full binary tree is **undecidable**.

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MSO+U fits ideally in — it defines ω -word languages requiring **arbitrarily many** set quantifiers.

Summary & further work

Making long story short. . .

Decidability



Definability



Low descr. complexity

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


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If there is no proof that $MSO+U$ is decidable, there should be a **direct** proof of **undecidability**.

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


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What about Borel quantifiers?

Rabin's theorem implies that $\text{MSO}(\mathbb{R}, <, \Sigma_2^0)$ is decidable.

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


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What about $\text{MSO}(\mathbb{R}, <, \Sigma_3^0)$? Or $\text{MSO}(\mathbb{R}, <, \mathbf{Borel})$?

Thank you for your attention!