Artur Rojszczak,
On Philosophical Background of Semantic Definition of Truth

Abstract:

The aim of the paper is to show that it is explicative character of Tarski's
semantic definition of truth given in his study of 1933 that allows for
consideration of philosophical background of his definition in the proper
sense. Given the explicative character of this definition it is argued that
the philosophical tradition that should be taken into account with regard
to this philosophical background is the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw
School in its connections with the School of Brentano. As an example of
the explanative power of considering this tradition as far as Tarski's
philosophical choices are concerned it is used here the notion of sentence-
-inscription, i.e. the notion of entity of which truth is predicated in the
definition in question. One of the consequences of these statements is that
philosophical discussions around semantic definition of truth can be
regraded from two points of view. On the one hand, they may take the
perspective of its explicational function, i.e. the perspective of its
philosophical background. On the other hand, they might consider the
consequences of the definition with respect to the goal of the explication,
i.e. they may consider its philosophical content independently of its
historical background.
 
 

Back to list of talks